China, as host of the six-party talks first convened in August 2003, has been one of the major players in dealing with the North Korean nuclear crisis that began in October 2002. China"s role in the talks has helped to start shaping a stable regional security architecture in Northeast Asia. Beijing"s leadership in building a new security regime in the region suggests a change on Chinese perspectives regarding its role within the broader East Asia"s regional security architecture. After years of passiveness with regards to involvement in security regime building in the region, China has evolved into an active leader seeking to shape a more institutionalized security. Despite the obstacles to building a functioning regime in Northeast Asia, China seems poised to continue working towards creation of a more stable and institutionalized security architecture.
On the other hand, there are those who have a more positive view regarding China"s behaviour. They point out that Beijing has been socialized in regional practices, learning how to operate within an environment in which the use of military force to solve inter-state disputes is, increasingly, not an option. Those defending this position explain that China"s military build-up is consistent with its increasing power, and therefore should not be seen as a threat by its neighbours. Moreover, unresolved territorial disputes have not produced substantial clashes since the end of the Cold War. Therefore, Beijing"s approach towards regional security is characterized by acceptance of the status quo. 2 For an analysis of this debate, see Shambaugh [38] .
However, little attention has been paid to the possibility that China might be willing to create a regional security architecture in Northeast Asia. Given China"s rise, it should be unsurprising that Beijing might want to construct a security regime. The reasons why China would seek to build a new regional security architecture will be explained in detail below. But here suffices to say that the still inconclusive debate regarding China"s approach towards security in Northeast Asia ought to contemplate the possibility that Chinese leaders are seeking to build a regime helping them to satisfy their security-related goals.
The six-party talks are the most appropriate case to illustrate China"s role in shaping a new security architecture in East Asia. There are three reasons for this. Firstly, the six-party talks are a security institution. Other groupings, such as ASEAN+3 or the East Asia Summit, have goals beyond promoting regional security cooperation. Secondly, the six-party talks are specific to Northeast Asia. Other security institutions in which China is involved, most notably the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) that Beijing helped to create, cover other regions in which actors and power balances are different. Finally, China has been actively involved in the development and functioning of the six-party talks from the onset.
The two other East Asian security institutions of which China is part, the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) and the ASEAN Defence Ministers" Meeting -Plus, were ASEAN initiatives.
Being a security institution specific to East Asia in which China has taken a leading role from the beginning, make the six-party talks an excellent case to judge how China would like a new regional security architecture to look like and why. This article will proceed as follows. The next section will summarize China"s approach to regional security prior to the creation of the six-party talks. Then, the article will focus on Beijing"s work to make the six-party talks succeed and the reasons behind this. Afterwards, the article will delve on the obstacles that China has encountered to build an institution to its liking. The section after then briefly examines China"s approach to the six-party talks since their interruption in December 2008. A concluding section will put an end to the article.
China and East Asian security prior to the six-party talks
Describing Chinese regional security policy prior to the establishment of six-party talks as both passive and assertive might seem contradictory. However, Beijing"s policy during the period was characterized by both elements. China was not involved in developing the ARF, launched in 1994 under the initiative of ASEAN. Similarly, Beijing was not particularly enthusiastic about track II projects such as the Northeast Asia Cooperation Dialogue or the Shangri-La Dialogue, among others. Beijing did participate in security-related and other institutions being created in East Asia. However, it was never one of the leaders in any of them. As Shambaugh explains, China would only become proactively engaged in regional institutions towards the end of the decade [38] , p. 69).
In fact, throughout the 1990s China seemed to be content with engaging in buck-passing to the United States even on issues with the potential to spill over inside its borders, such as the North Korean nuclear conundrum. 3 Throughout the first nuclear crisis of 1993-94, China"s role was minimal, with Beijing being unenthusiastic about mediating the crisis [23] , p. 362). 7 For an overview of how the crisis developed, see [18] .
Following the escalation of tensions and the failure of the trilateral talks, the George W. Bush administration began work to convene a multilateral forum to discuss the crisis. Even though ostensibly established to end the crisis, the ambition of the Bush administration went beyond dealing with the North Korean nuclear issue. From the onset, Washington saw the multilateral forum as a means to engage China in the resolution of a security conundrum and, subsequently, increase confidence at the bilateral and regional levels. Bush administration officials were adamant in having China work together with the United States to solve the crisis, insisting on Beijing to take a leading role in the resolution of one of East Asia"s most enduring security dilemmas [13] , pp. 300-328).
Beijing seemed at first hesitant to become deeply involved in the resolution of the crisis. The
Hu Jintao government publicly and privately stated that North Korea"s nuclear programme was a bilateral issue to be solved between Washington and Pyongyang. Even though China acted as host of the talks, it took a relatively passive approach towards discussions during the first three rounds, held in 2003 and 2004 [13] , pp. 337-361). China did not change the passive stance towards the North Korean nuclear issue that it had taken during the first nuclear crisis.
Not directly threatened by the Kim Jong Il regime"s programme and assured of stability in North Korea, Beijing had limited material incentive to become more involved in solving the crisis.
Thus, China"s approach to regional security seemed not to have evolved significantly from the period between the late 1990s and the early 2000s. Beijing was partaking in an initiative aimed at solving a security conundrum through multilateral diplomacy. China was hosting the talks, and Chinese officials were involved in six-party talks meetings. But it was other parties who were offering solutions to the nuclear crisis. South Korea was particularly active in this respect, bringing a proposal to the second round [13] , p. 349), and working with the United
States on the proposal that Washington presented on the third round [13] , p. 361). North
Korea made its own proposal as well [13] , pp. 349 & 359). The United States, reluctant to become actively engaged in the talks, finally presented during the third round a proposal previously developed with South Korea [13] , p. 357). As chair of the talks, China played an important role in liaising among the six parties. However, concrete proposals to solve the crisis were the prerogative of both Koreas and the United States, all of which had a greater interest in putting an end to it. Therefore, as of 2004 it could not be said that Beijing had taken a leading role in solving a security problem in East Asia.
Towards regime-building in Northeast Asia
China Afterwards, Beijing would remain active until the December 2008 round, the last to be convened at the time of writing. Between meetings, the Hu Jintao government dispatched its envoys to the talks to other countries more often than before [13] . China also sought to work towards a more stable security institution for Northeast Asia. Beijing supported the Northeast Asia Peace and Security Mechanism (NEAPSM) working group established in the February 2007 joint statement. Envisioned to provide Northeast Asia with an institution to deal with region-specific security issues, the NEAPSM would be a significant step if properly developed.
Outside of the six-party talks" process, China also demonstrated its willingness to take an active role in solving the North Korean nuclear issue. Following Pyongyang"s missile and nuclear tests conducted in, respectively, July and October 2006, China supported UNSC sanctions. This marked a significant change from Chinese behaviour throughout the first nuclear crisis, when Beijing refused to support any sanction on North Korea. Furthermore, the Hu government allowed financial sanctions on Banco Delta Asia, a Macau-based bank holding significant North Korean assets, to be implemented [12] . This showed that Beijing was willing to put pressure on Pyongyang. Concurrently, the Hu government also encouraged the Bush administration to engage North Korea through diplomacy following the 2006 tests [32] , p. 150). China therefore took a leading role in dealing with a security quagmire through non-military means.
The change in Chinese behaviour was driven by two inter-related factors. Firstly, there was a shift in policy from the Bush administration towards the North Korean nuclear issue. This change in behaviour was characterised by a more proactive and less antagonistic approach towards North Korea, which became increasingly evident as hawks left the Bush administration. Secondly, the change in behaviour from the Bush administration allowed
Chinese officials favouring a policy based on treating North Korea as a "normal" country to put their approach into practice. It was not possible to implement this approach as long as there was a threat of the US attacking North Korea. This threat dissipated as doves began to dominate Bush administration policy towards Pyongyang.
There is an ongoing debate among Chinese elites regarding relations with North Korea, dating to at least the 1990s. 9 On the one hand, there are elites who argue that North Korea should be treated as a special country. Chinese participation in the Korean War of 1950-53, the longstanding bilateral security treaty dating back to 1961 and North Korea"s strategic location are 9 For two excellent analyses of this debate and the rationale behind it, see [27, 29] . 
The six-party talks and China's role in the security of Northeast Asia
As already stated, the main aim of this article is to show how and why China is working to shape a new security regime in East Asia. The positive experience of the six-party talks in terms of improving relations among the major powers in Northeast Asia serves to understand the objectives China wants to achieve with such a regime, as well as the mechanisms Beijing seeks to develop to fulfil them. Even though the North Korean nuclear issue is yet to be Thanks to the six-party talks, Beijing was able to start dispelling Tokyo"s and Seoul"s fears.
Japanese and South Korean officials noted that their Chinese counterparts were acting responsibly. Praising China"s actions as host of the talks, they expressed confidence in having their views heard and taken into account. 10 They could also realize that China"s position with regards to North Korea was more nuanced than previously thought. The mechanism for China to construct a Northeast Asia-specific security regime is two-fold.
The first mechanism is institutionalized multilateral dialogue. Creating a security organization in the region is not realistic as long as the North Korean nuclear issue has not been resolved Beijing envisions this mechanism moving beyond the six-party talks in terms of scope and degree of institutionalization. 16 The February 2007 joint statement established a NEAPSM 15 Interview with senior China MFA official, 26 July 2011, London. 16 Interview with senior China MFA official, 22 April 2009, London.
working group. The mechanism would deal with security matters beyond the North Korean nuclear conundrum, and would meet regularly rather than on a case-by-case basis. Even though the working group to establish the mechanism has not met since 2008, this does not mean that the idea has been abandoned. Chinese officials have kept referring to it [11] , track II dialogues including representatives from China and studying the feasibility of the mechanism are running [39] , and the intention is for the mechanism to be established [34] , p.
5).
The second mechanism being promoted by China to achieve the confidence building and soft trade agreement have been launched as well. 17 Following the fifth summit meeting between the three countries, they agreed to launch negotiations for a trilateral FTA [25] . Were the agreement to materialize, relations among the three powers would probably strengthen.
Meanwhile, confidence building in the area of security is already being boosted by a Foreign Even though this trilateral dialogue would seem to work against the six-party talks, this is not necessarily the case. To begin with, the trilateral dialogue is more wide-ranging in scope. The dialogue began as an exercise to deal with financial matters in Northeast Asia. It has later evolved to include other items, including soft security issues. But hard security matters are not part of it. The trilateral dialogue could therefore complement the work of the six-party talks or the NEAPSM, it they are re-initiated. Furthermore, the trilateral dialogue could facilitate cooperation to soft balance American hawks. However, this soft balancing is not new; it already took place during six-party talks" meetings. Therefore, the trilateral dialogue would simply institutionalize an already existing practice rather than create a new source of tension in the region.
Obstacles to building a functioning security regime
The previous section analyzed the goals that China has pursued when building a security regime in Northeast Asia and the mechanisms the Hu government has employed to achieve this goal. Nevertheless, China has also encountered difficulties when constructing a workable security regime in the region. The most obvious has been the behaviour of North Korea. Nonetheless, if Beijing"s objectives are those described in the previous section, then a working security regime can still exist. The North Korean nuclear conundrum may have not disappeared, but a regime enhancing mutual confidence with American doves, Japan and South Korea, and balancing American hawks can still be in place.
These being the two goals that Beijing sought to achieve from regime-building, there were two separate obstacles that the Hu government had to overcome. The first one was China"s traditional policy with regards to North Korea, which could have undermined its role as a balancer. When the six-party talks were first convened in 2003, China had a long history of protecting North Korea from international criticism and intervention. The relationship between China and its neighbour was still characterized by many as "lips-to-teeth" [14] , p.
156). Indeed, Beijing had ensured that the UNSC refrained from imposing sanctions on
Pyongyang during the first nuclear crisis, as explained above. Even if this characterization might have become obsolete when the six-party talks were launched, China still remained the closest country that North Korea could call an ally. Furthermore, the North Korean economy was still heavily dependent on trade and aid from its neighbour [14] , p. 156). And China remained the only member of the six-party talks, aside from Russia, to have diplomatic relations with North Korea.
Thus, some officials expressed in private doubts about the role that China could play in the six-party talks. 18 There was mistrust towards Beijing. The Hu government had just replaced the Jiang Zemin government when the six-party talks were first convened. There was no reason to think that the new government would shift China"s decades-old policy of promoting North Korea"s political stability and economic openness. Therefore, China faced a major obstacle to obtain its goals: the countries with which it wanted to build confidence with did not trust Beijing"s intentions. There was a feeling that as long as stability was maintained in North Korea, China would not become actively involved in solving the second nuclear crisis.
To overcome this obstacle, China took several actions. Beijing became a real balancer in the six-party talks. Rather than siding with North Korea, Chinese officials took the needs and (TCOG). Meeting regularly since April 1999, the TCOG was the specific mechanism used by Japan, South Korea and the United States to coordinate their policies towards North Korea.
Surviving the Clinton administration, the TCOG met at regular intervals during the early years of the Bush administration [37] . The TGOC allowed the three countries to seek a common position for the first rounds of the six-party talks.
The presence of Washington"s two bilateral alliances and the TCOG could have undermined
China"s security regime-building efforts. Firstly, by presenting China with the task of confronting a common position by the three countries on how to deal with North Korea. And secondly, by allowing American hawks to obtain greater support for their policy towards
North Korea and therefore making them more difficult to overcome. In addition, their respective alliances with the United States are cornerstones of Japan"s and South Korea"s respective security and defence policies. Thus, besides having to overcome an obstacle with regards to the North Korean nuclear issue, China needed to be able to manage to improve its relationship with Japan, South Korea and the United States on the security realm.
The Hu government was also able to surmount this obstacle and lay the foundations for a regional security regime. Chinese behaviour during six-party talks" meetings and on the issue of sanctions has already been explained. This behaviour was useful to undermine a possible common position from Seoul, Tokyo and Washington, which nonetheless was never developed due to their differences on how to deal with North Korea. Nevertheless, more important to weaken the impact of the two bilateral alliances was Chinese behaviour between six-party talks" meetings and outside of this framework. With regards to the former, Chinese officials met with their counterparts from the five other parties away from the actual rounds of meetings [13] . Hence, China was able to discuss the North Korean nuclear issue on a bilateral basis. Thus, Beijing could convey to Seoul, Tokyo and Washington its views on how to bring a final solution to the crisis. These meetings did not directly undermine the bilateral alliances between the United States and the two other countries. However, they were an opportunity for
China to reassure them of their intentions and to find common ground. This was clearest in the case of South Korea. Beijing and Seoul had similar views on how to deal with the nuclear issue while Roh Moo-hyun was the South Korean president. Hence, China and South Korea presented similar solutions to the crisis [26] . Even under conservative Lee Myung-bak"s presidency, both countries would present the most serious proposal to revitalize the six-party talks in April 2011 [6] .
As for China"s behaviour outside of the six-party talks, the trilateral meetings with Japan and South Korea have already been described above. Rather than undermining the six-party talks, they serve to improve communication with Japan and South Korea. Thus, they could serve to find common ground on security matters if their scope is broadened. However, more useful to soft balance hawks, build confidence with doves, and make the Bush administration less reliant on the alliances with Japan and South Korea, was the Senior Dialogue between China and the United States first held in August 2005. Established to deal with security issues of mutual concern to Beijing and Washington, the dialogue brought together a large number of top-level officials from both countries. According to a Chinese official involved in it, the meetings were very helpful for Beijing and Washington to discuss security issues openly. 22 Even though these bilateral and trilateral dialogues and bilateral consultations outside of sixparty meetings could be seen as undermining multilateralism, actually they reinforce it by creating a diplomatic network that can function as a substitute for a proper security regime until a NEAPSM is established. Equally important for China, this network allows it to prevent the possibility of other countries coming up with a common position that would undermine its regime-building efforts. As Keohane and Nye explain, like-minded officials from different countries may create transgovernmental coalitions through direct contact in international institutions. These coalitions can serve for those officials to coordinate their policies and to influence the behaviour of their respective governments [20] . China"s bilateral and trilateral dialogues and meetings can serve this function and supplement the work of the six-party talks whilst the latter are not reconvened.
China and the six-party talks post-2008
Following the seventh round, held in December 2008, the six-party talks were interrupted.
This means that Chinese efforts at building a working security regime have been disturbed, if not completely halted in the near term. Notwithstanding this disruption, Chinese behaviour since the seventh round of the six-party talks took place has demonstrated Beijing"s shift from passiveness, assertiveness and unilateralism to leadership, cooperation and multilateralism.
Indeed, North Korea"s refusal to return to the six-party talks seems to have reinforced China"s belief in a new approach towards its neighbour [29] , pp. 119-120). At the regional level, China seems to have moved further towards building a viable security regime.
The ideal regime, the NEAPSM, is not a realistic possibility as long as the six-party talks are not reconvened. In the future, this mechanism might be used to deal with security problems in Northeast Asia aside from the North Korean nuclear crisis. However, the NEAPSM has so far not gone beyond being a working group of the six-party talks. Thus, North Korea still has to be part of it. As long as the talks are not reconvened, the NEAPSM cannot become a reality.
And even if a new round of talks takes place, the most pressing issue will be to deal with Pyongyang"s nuclear programme rather than to develop the NEAPSM.
Hence, China has showed its dedication to building a regional security regime in other ways.
Most notably, Beijing has maintained its commitment to the six-party talks" framework. China"s commitment to the talks has been remarkable given the hesitance to resume them that other parties have sometimes displayed. North Korea announced that it was abandoning the talks in early 2009 [19] . South Korea also made a similar announcement. Foreign Minister Kim Sung-hwan stated that the talks would be affected following the sinking of the Cheonan navy ship in March 2010 and the North Korean shelling of Yeonpyeong in November of the same year [5] . Seoul demanded an apology for both incidents from Pyongyang before talks would resume. 24 Meanwhile, the Obama administration was ambivalent with regards to the talks. Obama stated that the administration wanted the North Korean government to cease provocations and abide by the agreements reached in the six-party talks [40] . Washington made clear that Pyongyang had to show its willingness to abandon brinkmanship before it contemplated the possibility of resuming the talks. Similarly, Japan was also unconvinced of the value of the talks. Foreign Minister Seiji Maehara maintained that talks should not be reconvened until North Korea ceased provocations and real progress could be made [15] .
Hence, besides Russia, China was the only country unmistakeably committed to resumption of the six-party talks.
Chinese commitment to cooperation and diplomacy rather than assertiveness was also Therefore, in private the Hu government was putting pressure on North Korea to abandon brinkmanship and return to the multilateral and cooperative framework of the six-party talks.
Joining international public condemnation of the Cheonan and Yeonpyeong incidents would have been counterproductive. Beijing regarded both issues bilateral inter-Korean affairs, rather than regional affairs. Moreover, China was displeased with the Lee Myung-bak government"s tougher stance on its Northern neighbour. Therefore, assumptions that the Hu government would publicly condemn North Korean behaviour in these two cases were unrealistic. China had to juggle pressure on Pyongyang with the goal of resuming the regime around which Chinese officials seek to construct a security framework for Northeast Asia.
Further pressure on North Korea would have probably slowed down achievement of this goal.
Conclusions
The goals that China wants to achieve in East Asia through the security regime it is trying to build do not point towards regional hegemony. Rather, these objectives indicate that Chinese officials want to reduce uncertainties regarding China"s well-documented rise, moving beyond the animosity that prevailed in the 1990s. If not amity, China would want to at least enhance trust in its actions from other states in the region, while concurrently weakening the position of hawks more likely to try to contain Beijing.
A deep analysis for the rationale behind these objectives is beyond the scope of this article, but it seems that Beijing"s focus on domestic development might be the main reason. Hu"s emphasis on balanced and sustainable socioeconomic growth necessitates a peaceful and stable international environment. This way China can concentrate its economic resources on sustaining domestic development, rather than having to substantially increase spending on the People"s Liberation Army to prepare for a possible clash with the United States or a regional power.
The mechanisms employed to achieve the two objectives outlined suggest that Beijing seeks to focus its economic resources on domestic growth. Deepening participation in existing multilateral institutions is arguably the most cost-effective means to advance those goals.
Complementing this mechanism with a widening institutional framework plus bilateral dialogues is also more economical than engaging in hard balancing. Bilateral dialogues may also be the only way for the Chinese government to achieve its goals in the fragmented region that East Asia still is.
Ultimately, any sustainable security regime will need China to take a leading role. Similarly, it will need to be based on cooperation at the multilateral level. Otherwise, lingering mistrust will not disappear. Hence, China"s move in the early 21 st century towards building a security regime in the six-party talks is a welcome development. Even if this particular regime fails to
